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Sarah Barringer Gordon. The lVformon Question: 
Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in 
Nineteenth-Century America. 
Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. 
Reviewed by Nathan B. Oman 
L aw libraries are generally boring places to outsiders (and to many insiders). Row upon row of identically bound books containing the argu-
ments oflong-dead judges hardly make the blood boil or e.xcite the imagina-
tion of most. Yet Latter-day Saints venturing into the volumes of United 
States Supreme Court decisions from the closing decades of the nineteenth 
century may well be surprised by what they find. For example, in 1890 the 
Court suggested that The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints was 
not entitled to constitutional protection because Mormonism was not 
really a religion. l In another case, the Court held that states could (and they 
did) pass laws denying the vote to any who believed in "the doctrine of 
celestial marriage."2 Such cases are the dusty remains of the massive legal 
war waged by the federal government against the Church over the practice 
of plural marriage. 
'When I first read these cases in college, as a Latter-day Saint I had a vis-
ceral, tribal reaction. Notwithstanding the passage of time and the change 
of practice, 3 I felt betrayed by America and the Constitution. And I was dis-
appointed at the scholarly treatment of the Church's early legal struggles. 
Despite the evocative power of these decisions, Mormon historians have 
written comparatively little on polygamy and antipolygamy from a legal 
perspective.4 Law, it seems, has remained a relatively neglected field within 
Mormon studies. This omission is unfortunate, because the legal history of 
the Church is a fascinating story that touches on many of the most funda-
mental questions in American jurisprudence. In particular, the legal war 
waged over polygamy was one of the titanic-and largely unstudied-
struggles of American legal history. 
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In The J.'.;Iormon Question, Susan Barringer Gordon tackles this particu-
lar story. Currently on the history and law faculties of the University of 
Pennsylvania, she specializes in the history of church-state relations in 
nineteenth-century America. Although she has published articles related 
to Mormon history,5 The lvIormon Question is her first book. It has three 
main strengths: it offers a much more nuanced and sympathetic portrayal 
of the ideology of antipolygamist activists than one generally finds in Mor-
mon history; it offers insights culled from the vast records of the Utah Ter-
ritorial courts; and it places the Supreme Court's polygamy cases in their 
legal and historical contex1:s. 
Mormon writers have often described nineteenth-century anti-
polygamists in harsh terms, painting them as hypocrites more interested in 
scoring cheap political points than in earnestly protecting hearth and home. 
B. H. Roberts summed up this view, writing: 
Honorable individual exceptions to this arraignment of the anti-
"Mormon" "crusaders" are cheerfully and gladly conceded; but they are 
exceptions. For the rest, the indictment for hypocrisy, sex immorality, 
indifference to the purity of the horne, on the part of the" crusaders," 
stands. Their concern about the alleged evils of polygamy was mere pre-
tense. The real cause of this anti-''lvIormon'' crusade was a fight for the 
political control of Utah on the part of the "crusaders. "6 
Modern Mormon historians may lack Roberts's stridency, but they 
often agree in substance with his views.i Gordon, in contrast, argues that 
concern with polygamy was actually central to the federal government's 
crusade and formed an important part of the "cosmology" of the GOP 
politicians who dominated post-Civil War politics. 
According to Gordon, the roots of the crusade lie in the sentimental 
antipolygamy novels of the 1850S and 1860s. Written by middle-class 
women, these novels appealed to a middle-class audience, portraying 
polygamy as a barbaric and soul-destroying despotism. Often sensational-
istic and having "little basis in fact" (30), the novels served an explicit politi-
cal function. They were meant to excite their readers to action. 
Accordingly, they belong to the same genre as antislavery novels such as 
Uncle Tom's Cabin, which were meant to encourage participation in aboli-
tionist politics. In this sense, whatever their limitations as literature or his-
tory, the antipolygamy novels were wildly successful, as were the 
antislavery novels (32). 
The sentimental and reformist calls of the antipolygamy novels com-
bined vvith a Republican ideology dominated by ideas of human progress 
and the social preconditions of democracy to form a powerful and coherent 
attack on Mormons' peculiar institution. In this "cosmology," it was Progress 
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that had brought man to the point where he was fit for self-government. 
According to the antipolygamy theorists of the 1860s and 1870S, man had 
passed from a primordial sexual promiscuity, to an ancient polygamy, and 
finally to modern monogamy. It went without saying, of course, that the 
movement was from bad to good, from barbarism to civilization. Thus 
polygamy represented a form of sexual regression against the evolutionary 
progress of history. However, this was not all. It also rendered its practi-
tioners unfit for the task of self-government. Like slavery, polygamy pro-
duced a stagnant despotism inconsistent ,-vith the dynamism of a free and 
democratic society. Accordingly, in the minds of antipolygamy activists, 
Mormons could not be allowed to govern themselves until they had aban-
doned their "relic of barbarism" and progressed to the point already 
reached by the rest of the country. 
Gordon chronicles the increasingly harsh measures that this ideology 
justified against Mormons. Beginning in the 1860s, successive Republican 
Congresses passed laws punishing polygamy in the territories. The pace 
and severity of these laws increased after the Civil War as penalties were 
ratcheted up and procedures to facilitate conviction were devised, culmi-
nating in a massive wave of prosecutions in the 1880s and the financial and 
corporate dismemberment of the Church. Gordon records that during the 
territorial period, the federal government prosecuted over two thousand 
criminal cases in Utah, and fully 95 percent of these were for sexual 
crimes-polygamy, unlawful cohabitation, and fornication. The sheer vol-
ume of prosecutions for sexual offenses, she notes, "is, literally, unique in 
American legal history" (156). Virtually all of the prosecutions for sex 
crimes were tied to plural marriage. 
The massive scale of prosecutions resulted from two factors: the suc-
cess of the Church leaders in evading arrest and the success of Mormon 
law-yers in defeating overreaching prosecutoriallegal theories. Initially, fed-
eral officials hoped to crush plural marriage by imposing very long sen-
tences on a few prominent leaders such as the First Presidency and the 
Quorum of the Twelve. In order to accomplish that aim, prosecutors first 
needed to catch the leaders and next persuade the courts to "segregate" 
offenses. Because of the difficulty of proving multiple marriage cere-
monies, federal officials relied on the offense of unlaviful cohabitation, the 
crime of actually living with more than one woman as a wife. Ingenious 
prosecutors piled on the punishment by segregating the offense tempo-
rally. Thus, Lorenzo Snow was prosecuted for three counts of unlawful 
cohabitation-one count for each of three successive years. In theory, the 
offenses could be infinitely segregated. For example, one year of plural 
marriage could be divided in 365 separate counts of unla"wful cohabitation, 
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one count for each day. This allowed prosecutors to pile very large fines and 
lona prison sentences on targeted defendants. In effect, segregation trans-
for;ed unlawful cohabitation, which was technically only a misdemeanor, 
into a major criminal offense. However, the Mormons successfully 
stymied the initial federal strategy. First, Mormon leaders went on the 
"underground," an elaborate system of safe houses and hiding places that 
allowed them to avoid arrest. Second, the Church's lawyers succeeded in 
persuading the U.S. Supreme Court to strike down the practice of segrega-
tion.8 The federal prosecutors responded by shifting to a strategy of wider, 
but less dramatic, convictions. The result was an all-out effort to prose-
cute and jail every polygamist that federal marshals could arrest, regard-
less of prominence. 
The Mormons responded by resisting. While most of the fighting 
involved "the bloodless tourney oflawyers" (156), Gordon notes that "some 
players descended into violence, as in 1885 when Sarah Nelson beat two 
deputies with a broomstick as they attempted to serve process on her hus-
band's other wives" (156). Most Mormons, however, resisted through per-
jury and concealment: many-especially women-were sent to prison for 
contempt of court when they refused to answer questions implicating 
family members and fellow Saints. 
Gordon also documents how this Mormon resistance frustrated 
antipolygamists, who responded with harsher legislation. In addition, the 
legalization of the antipolygarny movement in the late 1870S and especially 
in the 1880s marked a masculinization of the process. While the chief 
figures in antipolygamy politics during the 1850S and 1860s had been 
female novelists and lecturers, in the 1870S and 1880s these women were 
increasingly marginalized, as male legislators, la'wyers, and judges emerged 
as the key players. Also, as it became apparent that Latter-day Saint women 
were partners in resistance-rather than the imagined passive victims of 
domineering and lascivious Mormon patriarchs-sympathy for them 
among eastern antipolygamists faded, reinforcing a harsher, more punitive 
attitude. Thus, the political support for the Edrnunds-Tucker Act-which 
dismembered the institutional Church, confiscating its property-was 
generated in part by the fortitude of the Mormon response to federal prose-
cutions. Yet despite the ultimately self-defeating logic of Mormon resis-
tance, Gordon praises the political and legal sophistication of the 
polygamist resisters. Indeed, despite continual legislative defeats from 1882 
on, Mormon la'wyers were able to score some notable victories in court and 
at the very least forced federal attorneys to fight for each conviction. 
Gordon's book shines brightest in its treatment of the cases that 
the Church fought all the way to the Supreme Court. Her discussion of 
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the landmark decision in Reynolds v. United States 9 provides an example of 
her analysis. The Reynolds decision, handed down in 1878, is generally 
acknowledged as a seminal case because for the first time the Supreme 
Court positively interpreted the content of the First Amendment's religion 
clauses. The traditional account of Reynolds goes something like this: In the 
mid-1870S, Mormon leaders decided to test the constitutional validity of 
antipolygamy laws. George Reynolds provided the information necessary 
to convict himself, appealed to the Supreme Court, and argued that the law 
violated his right to the free exercise of his religion. The Court responded 
by ruling that the term "free exercise" in the First Amendment referred 
only to religious belief and did not cover religious action. 
According to Gordon, this account is overly simplistic and largely 
misses the main issues in the case. She argues that Reynolds was not simply 
a "test-case" in which the Mormons turned to the courts for protection. 
Rather, it was part of a broader political strategy aimed primarily at Con-
gress. President George Q. Cannon, who was Utah's delegate to the House 
of Representatives, instigated the suit as part of a "costly strategy ... to turn 
to law in the hope of tying up Republicans in the tangles of Supreme Court 
doctrine" (149), In fact, prior to Reynolds there had been no polygamy con-
victions for the simple reason that proving polygamous marriages was 
nearly impossible. It was only after the Court's decision that Congress 
responded with unlawful cohabitation statutes that allowed, for the first 
time, wholesale prosecution of polygamists. Thus, Reynolds was aimed not 
at halting federal law enforcement but at providing Cannon with constitu-
tional arguments that he could use with political fence-sitters in Congress. 
Ultimately, Cannon's strategy backfired, not only because it cleared the 
constitutional road for convictions, but also because it provided the polit-
ical impetus to pass laws facilitating them. 
Gordon also attacks the simple jurisprudential account of the tradi-
tional Reynolds story. She notes that Reynolds's attorneys actually directed 
most of their attention not to the First Amendment but to the continuing 
vitality of the Dred Scott 10 decision.!! In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court over-
turned the Missouri Compromise (and by implication the Compromise of 
1850) and held that the federal government could not forbid slavery in the 
territories. Most modern lawyers assume that the Civil War Amendments, 
which outlawed slavery and granted constitutional protection to freed slaves, 
overturned Dred Scott, eviscerating any precedential value it might have. 
However, as Gordon demonstrates, in the years following the Civil War, 
many la'wyers assumed that while the Thirteenth Amendment banned 
slavery, Dred Scott continued to be good law' to the extent that it limited 
the power of the federal government to regulate "domestic" issues in the 
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territories. The traditional account of Reynolds thus assumes-rnistakenly-
that the federal government had an unquestioned right to legislate for the 
territories and that the only issue was whether or not the First Amendment 
protected polygamy. In reality, the power of the federal government over 
the territories was still an open question in 1878, and notwithstanding the 
Court's silent rejection of his arguments, Reynolds had good reasons for 
believing that Congress did not have the power to legislate on "domestic" 
issues such as marriage. 
Gordon also points out that Reynolds presented an argument that was 
as much an Establishment Clause argument as a Free Exercise Clause argu-
ment. Today, at least in part because of the Reynolds decision, la'wyers tend 
to think of the First Amendment's religion clauses as two parts of a single 
national law of religion. The Free Exercise Clause protects private religious 
conduct from the government, while the Establishment Clause forbids reli-
gious activity by the state. Gordon, however, shows that imposing such an 
understanding on the Reynolds decision is anachronistic. The Supreme 
Court did not apply the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the 
states until well into the twentieth century. 12 Even then, the religion clauses 
were not applied directly but rather were applied as part of the Supreme 
Court's evolving interpretation of the concept of "due process" under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. In contrast, during the nineteenth century, 
la'wyers conceptualized the religion clauses in terms of jurisdiction. The 
First Amendment allocated power over religion by forbidding any federal 
action on the issue. Reynolds argued that these limitations protected local 
autonomy in matters of faith. Because Mormonism was, in a sense, the 
"established" church in Utah, the federal government was forbidden from 
intervening \vith it through antipolygamy legislation. 
The Court brushed all of these issues aside through a simple move: it 
used state law to interpret the federal constitution. Thus, rather than view-
ing the First Amendment as allocating power over religion to various levels 
of government, the Court analogized it to early legislation in Virginia 
sponsored by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison. This legislation had 
provided for some measure oflocal religious toleration and had weakened 
the established Episcopal Church in Virginia. The Court then applied this 
analysis to the First Amendment, arguing that it too was a general mandate 
of religious toleration. Having created a substantive rather than jurisdic-
tionallaw of religion using the First Amendment, the Court ruled that this 
national law provided no protection for the practice of (as opposed to belief 
in) plural marriage. "This jurisprudential sleight of hand;' Gordon notes, 
"substituted the democratic ex-perience of one jurisdiction-Virginia-for 
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a process that would have allowed each jurisdiction to determine for itself 
the meaning and scope of the law of religion within its boundaries. This 
substitution was profoundly nationalizing" (134). 
Gordon also, almost grudgingly, acknowledges that "prejudice against 
Mormons and their alternative faith played a role in the decision" (142). 
She notes that the Court used racist arguments to support its conclusion, 
placing the Mormons outside of its nationally homogenous sphere of pro-
tection in part by analogizing them to "the Asiatic and ... African peoples" 
(142). Both of these groups, in turn, were identified in the nineteenth-
century white American imagination with sexual immorality and anti-
democratic indolence. The Court thus implied that Mormons shared what 
one nineteenth-century writer called the "[Negroes'] ungovernable 
propensity to miscellaneous sexual indulgence" 13 and the supposed Asi-
atic predilection for despotism. 
On the whole, this is an excellent book. I would have enjoyed a more 
detailed, blow-by-blow account of the Raid and more of Gordon's detailed 
analysis of judicial decisions. Others may wish that the discussion of 
antipolygamy fiction were longer. This tension between the discussion 
of legal issues and the discussion of social context, however, is inherent to 
contemporary legal history. For many years, Anglo-American legal histori-
ans wrote about the law as though it were a self-contained social phenome-
non. Their work tended to focus almost exclusively-{)n the development of 
legal doctrine, with occasional side notes on the life of the bench and bar. 14 
In response to this insularity, modern legal historians have focused on the 
ways in which the law reflects and interacts vvith its social context. IS On this 
spectrum, Gordon has put more weight on the social side and less on the 
legal side. 
Reflection on the legal storm recorded by Gordon gives Latter-day 
Saint scholars two valuable opportunities. First, the tenacity and commit-
ment of nineteenth-century Mormons, which Gordon details, provides a 
powerful reminder of the importance of this period for modern Latter-day 
Saints. As Orson Scott Card has written: 
Mormons still treasure the myth of persecution: abuse a Mormon 
because of his beliefs, and he is almost grateful for the chance to bravely 
resist you, for it proves that he is worthy of the sacrifices of his ancestors. 
Polygamy named us as a people, and though polygamy is gratefully 
behind us now, we still live on the strength of its legacy.16 
To her credit, Gordon has the sensitivity to understand this connection 
to the past, writing that the "loss of the battle for polygamy was bitter and 
still resonates in Mormons' historical scholarship. The authority of the 
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Constitution ... reflected the interest of the enemies of Zion" (222). 
Thus, despite the oft-repeated identification of Mormonism as the quint-
essentially "American religion,"17 the relationship of the Saints to the legal 
ideology of the United States is ambiguous. It is worth remembering that, 
at the supreme moment of confrontation between Mormonism and the 
state, the Constitution and its institutions failed the Saints. Ironically, this 
failure is something that most American Latter-day Saints, who take an 
unabashedly celebratory attitude towards the Constitution, seem to 
have forgotten. 18 
Second, the ultimate failure of the Constitution to protect Zion from 
her attackers gives Latter-day Saints a unique position from which to criti-
cally understand the current legal system, even while Mormon scripture 
forecloses a complete break with constituted legal authority.19 Mormons 
today tend to place almost exclusive emphasis on "being subject to kings, 
presidents, rulers, and magistrates, in obeying, honoring, and sustaining 
the law" (A of F 12). Gordon's work, however, provides a powerful 
reminder that there are other possibilities within Mormon theology and 
experience. Confronting the tenacious, powerful, and at times radical 
arguments offered by Mormonism's legal defenders in the nineteenth cen-
tury contains a promise for Latter-day Saints who care about jurisprudence 
in the tlventy-first century. Law requires that we work out the limits of col-
lective, government authority and the strength of the claims of faith to 
individual and communal self-definition. This constant negotiation and 
confrontation betlveen God and Caesar is a central question oflegal theory. 
Gordon's book illustrates Mormonism's past ability to provide valuable 
perspectives on that question, perspectives that powerfully question the 
law's claims to authority. More generally, her work suggests that Mor-
mon thought and experience contain rich opportunities for Latter-day 
Saints who have the luxury of thinking about such problems in less 
troubled times.20 
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